One of the most challenging situations for paediatric clinicians is responding to parental requests for life-sustaining medical therapies for a child with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities. These therapies (e.g. intravenous medications and fluids, gastrostomy tube feeds, dialysis, tracheostomy and/or mechanical ventilation) offer the possibility for the child to live, at home or in a facility, for months or years as opposed to experiencing their imminent death. While relatively rare, the tension surrounding these requests can be exceptionally high, as illustrated by the cases of Baby K, Baby Joseph, Jahi McMath, Charlie Gard and many others from our own experience. In these situations, clinicians may strongly recommend against life-sustaining medical therapies, but receive persistent and often impassioned requests for such interventions from a child's family. For clinicians, some of the discomfort in responding to these requests may be related to concerns not that life-sustaining interventions will not work, but rather the likelihood that they will. It highlights the inadequacy of applying the best-interests standard for medical decision-making for children with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities who may appear to be noncommunicative and to have limited awareness of their surroundings, something noted by the philosopher John Arras more than 30 years ago (1) . Drawing in part from Arras's work, we propose that clinicians should use a relational potential standard rather than solely a best-interests standard when considering parental requests for life-sustaining medical therapies for children with profound disabilities.
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD FOR CHILDREN WITH PROFOUND DISABILITY
The best-interests standard requires parents and clinicians to weigh the net benefits and burdens of a potential treatment option, focusing only on the current and future 'self-regarding' interests of that child from child's point of view (2). To determine a child's best interests, parents and clinicians must first articulate what the child's interests are. For children who appear to have minimal awareness of their surroundings, it may be challenging to identify discrete interests or to describe the benefits derived from ongoing existence, and thus, the calculation of benefits and burdens may be reduced solely to a discussion of whether the pain associated with a medical treatment is greater than the pain associated with nontreatment. Further, in most, though not all situations, clinicians have the ability to provide treatments that will limit or eliminate a child's pain and discomfort. Arras argued that for such children, by narrowing the range of meaningful data to the presence or absence of unrelievable pain, the best-interests standard has been 'pushed beyond the pale of its capabilities' (3). Indeed, in these cases, it is a mistake to inquire only about the interests of such children or to insist that decisions to initiate, continue or terminate treatment are made solely in terms of the child's experience of benefits and burdens.
One response to this concern is the application of the harm principle as developed by Diekema, which functions as a threshold for clinicians to consider requesting state intervention to prevent parents from causing likely, imminent and serious harm usually in the setting of treatment refusals (4) . In this sense, it is a negative standard used to define what parent choices, particularly refusals, should not be permitted. The harm principle still relies on an assessment of benefits and burdens to the child alone and also provides little guidance for clinicians following a parental request for life-sustaining therapies for a child with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities. An illustrative example is a parental request for tracheostomy and mechanical ventilation for a child with neuromuscular disease and profound neurodevelopmental disability. While it is true that tracheostomy and mechanical ventilation could not be expected to result in an improvement in the child's neurodevelopmental status, such treatment is not futile if the parents' desired benefit from treatment is to extend the child's life, as tracheostomy and mechanical ventilation could do so successfully. Tracheostomy would result in increased discomfort surrounding the surgery; however, this could be treated and ultimately one would expect less discomfort with ventilation via a tracheostomy than an endotracheal tube. As this example highlights, simply considering the child's self-regarding best interests of limiting pain by weighing the relative degree of pain related to the two treatment options is inadequate for decision-making. Similarly, while an application of the harm principle does not clearly demonstrate the parents' request places the child at risk for serious, preventable and imminent harm, the harm principle also fails to provide positive justification for clinicians to support the parent's request. Both standards fail to recognise the value of the caring relationships between the parent and child. Recognising these limitations, Arras argued that clinicians should consider the value of human relationships (1).
THE RELATIONAL POTENTIAL STANDARD
The relational potential standard is inspired by Arras's recognition that it is not only our interests and experiences that matter -our relationships with others are also part of the basic human goods that make life worth living (1). Arras argued that the potential of an impaired child to possess self-consciousness and form relationships with others should be central in medical decision-making rather than a strict interpretation of the child's best interests (1). We propose a significant expansion and reformulation of Arras' relational potential standard based upon recognition of the moral value and meaning of the special caring relationship between parent and child. The relational potential standard is supported by an application of the ethics of care-based framework, which focuses on the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we have responsibility (5). The caring relationship between parent and child is intertwined and cannot be broken down into individual gains and losses for the individual members. Rather what matters is the health and growth of the relationship encompassing the family as a whole. This view of the value of caring relationships cannot be understood in the individualistic terms of standard moral theories designed to maximise satisfaction or interest (5). In our view, the caring relationship between parent and child remains morally meaningful even if the child has limited or no observable ability to reciprocate and the relationship may appear one-directional. This is consistent with other valued apparently one-way relationships such as that of the mother and her newborn (6). Clinicians should not deny relational potential to an individual who has become a parent and requests to continue to be a caregiver for their child who will remain dependent and receive their parent's love provided the associated harms of the treatment (primarily pain) to that child are limited. Rather clinicians should provide support to permit the relationship to flourish as a unit.
No parent of a child can meet all her needs in a vacuum. Society, and in turn clinicians, must play a role to allow parents to access certain resources that they require to fulfil their ethical obligations to their child (7) . Clinicians have a special responsibility to respond to parental requests for potentially efficacious treatment that does not pose significant harms even if those clinicians believe they would make a different decision for their family members if they faced a similar situation. Respect for parental requests is important because there is an asymmetry to the relationship between parent and clinician as certain services are only available with the active participation of clinicians (e.g. intravenous medications and fluids, gastrostomy feeds, dialysis or mechanical ventilation), and thus, clinicians hold the power to deliver (or not) a resource that is central to family's long-term experience.
The expanded relational potential standard is supported by the recognition that even children with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities and a significantly foreshortened lifespan can be highly valued members of their families. In one series of 159 parents of a child with trisomy 13 or 18 who lived longer than three months, 98% reported that this child enriched their life (8) . One parent noted 'We loved her as we love our other children. Our children have value. We do not love our kids because of their accomplishments. We love our kids because they are our kids' (8) . The caring parent-child relationship is deeply morally meaningful and should impact the calculus of medical decision-making.
One criticism of the relational potential standard is that it may objectify children with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities and violate the ethical obligation to respect them as persons (the Kantian imperative to treat them as ends in themselves and not merely as means to another's end). We believe that it is possible for clinicians to maintain respect for the child as a person (an end in themselves) while still broadening the focus of decision-making. Showing respect to the child requires limiting pain, preventing or removing burdens when possible, and providing the child with the best possible experience of life. If a child's only observable interest is to avoid pain and that can be satisfied (e.g. with pain medications) then the relational potential standard does respect children with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities as ends in themselves rather than solely the means to another's end. Application of the relational potential standard broadens the moral focus from the individual child alone to include the caring relationships others may have with the child. Clinicians may be concerned that parents who request life-sustaining treatments for their child with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities are seeking primarily to further their own individual interests (5) . However, the ethics of care-based framework recognises that within a caring relationship the interests of the caregiver and the one who is cared for are interwoven. In providing requested life-sustaining treatment, the clinician is supporting the relationship between parent and child (7) .
A second criticism of the relational potential standard is that it may lead to indefinite treatment at the discretion of parents. Taken to its extreme conclusion, it would support a parent who does not recognise the concept of brain death and requests continued therapies. This is a valid concern, although it should be noted that it represents an extreme case that may arise within an already uncommon set of circumstances. Full exploration of this rare and uniquely complex medical and legal situation is outside the scope of this brief article.
Similarly, there may be a concern that adoption of a supplemental relational potential standard may significantly increase societal healthcare costs if children who would have otherwise died are provided life-sustaining medical therapies. It is true that acceptance of the relational potential standard may result in the initiation and continuation of expensive life-sustaining treatment for children who are likely to remain profoundly disabled and to experience a limited life-expectancy. There are two potential responses to this concern. First, it must be noted that children with profound disabilities who require life-sustaining therapy account for a relatively small portion of overall healthcare expenditure compared with other costs such as that of adult end-of-life care (9) . Second, when considering financial costs of providing treatment, these must be weighed against the moral costs of withholding desired and efficacious therapies from those most burdened and most vulnerable members of our society, such as a child with profound disability and their parents. While costs are an important consideration in all aspects of healthcare, application of rationing criteria based on cost should occur publicly, at a state or national level, rather than at a bedside where the disabled child and their parents have a muted voice. There may be several other concerns related to our proposed relational potential standard which will require further exploration, including cultural variability in the concepts of justice and quality of life and the limits of applying this standard in cases where children are wards of the state or otherwise lack caring families. Full exploration of these concerns is beyond the scope of this brief article. Like the best-interests standard and the harm principle, the relational potential standard simply cannot account for all of the complex challenges that may arise at the edges of clinical care. However, this does not diminish its value as another layer to consider and another lens with which to evaluate the most difficult cases.
CONCLUSION
Decisions regarding life-sustaining medical therapies for young children with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities can be extremely challenging for families as well as clinicians, yet individualistic decision-making standards such as best interests and the harm principle provide insufficient guidance. The relational potential standard offers an additional framework for evaluating these cases and may provide a moral justification for clinicians to support an informed parent's decision to pursue lifesustaining medical therapies in the setting of uncertain, unknown or potentially limited benefit to the child. This is borne from the ethics of care and is based upon the recognition that parents develop intense caring relationships with their child even if their child is perceived to have limited ability or no ability to reciprocate and these caring relationships have meaning and moral value. Clinicians are well served to maintain humility with respect to what is possible for any one child, as a child given the opportunity to receive love from their parents and ongoing medical care may exceed our expectations in developing their own capacities (whatever those may be) and maintaining caring relationships (10) . When faced with a parental request to provide life-sustaining treatments for a child with profound neurodevelopmental disabilities, clinicians should recognise the value of the special relationships between parent and child. Relational potential is an important consideration and may provide a sound reason for clinicians to support parental requests for life-sustaining treatments.
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